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Abstract 
We discuss how creditor- and market-sourced BIS banking and securities statistics improve 
stability analysis by providing globally standardised financial data not readily available 
elsewhere. BIS data help to systematically quantify risk exposures that develop from 
financing positions, including low external liquidity, currency mismatches or common creditor 
linkages.  
1. Introduction 
Initiatives to compile (BIS) data originate in the Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS) or Markets Committee, when senior central bank representatives consider that new 
data need to be collected. These compilation initiatives have provided data important to 
analysing financial stability concepts not available elsewhere. 
Two main sets of BIS statistics that are particularly relevant to emerging markets are 
reviewed in this note.
1 The first set, the banking statistics, is obtained from a group of BIS 
reporting countries. These statistics are aggregated from banks’ balance sheets, so, unlike 
traditional flow data, they enable analysts to measure the impact of valuation changes on 
outstanding stocks. Other statistical initiatives, such as the compilation of international 
investment position (IIP) data, which complement traditional balance of payments (BoP) 
data, seem to validate the BIS approach.
2
The second set of statistics pertains to international debt securities. In response to the shift 
from bank finance to bond finance in the aftermath of the international banking crisis of 1982, 
the CGFS suggested that the BIS compile a database of individual international securities 
that can be analysed in at least 12 dimensions. Experience with this database has informed 
more recent securities databases, such as at the European Central Bank (ECB). In 
particular, the information from this BIS database has helped in building and checking the 
new Centralised Securities Database (CSDB) at the ECB, which is intended to provide better 
quality data on issues (and later holdings) of securities in the Euro area. 
                                                  
∗   Bank for International Settlements. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the official position of the BIS. We would like to thank Philip Turner for useful comments, 
Michael Chui for contributing to the analysis of common lender effects, and San Sau Fung and Pablo Garcia-
Luna for research assistance. 
1   The BIS triennial survey on foreign exchange and derivatives turnover and amounts outstanding also provides 
data relevant to financial stability in emerging markets. 
2   For example, see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). At the IMF, in line with the increased emphasis on key 
balance sheet risks and financial vulnerabilities, recent issues of the World Economic Outlook and Global 
Financial Stability Report, and other studies (eg Rosenberg et al (2005)) have applied balance sheet analysis. 
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 Some ways in which these BIS statistics have been used for financial stability analysis are 
summarised below.  
2.  Uses of BIS statistics for financial stability  
2.1  Exposures of BIS reporting banks 
BIS statistics reveal aspects of the exposures of BIS reporting banks and their debtors that 
are not available from other sources. 
2.1.1  Measurement of external debt 
BIS statistics provide an alternative reliable source of estimates of external debt to private 
creditors based on data provided by market and creditor sources, as opposed to (official) 
debtor information. As a result, they have helped improve measurement of external debt. To 
illustrate, Figure 1, left-hand panel shows debtor data (in columns, based on data published 
in the World Bank’s “Global Development Finance” (GDF) reports available up to 1998) and 
BIS data (stacked so that the line segments sum to the total) available around the time of the 
Asian crisis. They reveal that in 1997, Thailand’s external debt to private creditors was 
estimated at $75 billion; in fact the BIS statistics suggest that it was at least 40% higher. 
Indeed, Thailand’s external data were subsequently revised upward,
3 changing perceptions 
of Thailand’s external debt vulnerability. Under the original estimates, the ratio of external 
debt to exports of goods and services in 1996 was 106%; under revised estimates it turned 
out to be considerably higher. The fact that BIS banking statistics have contributed to a much 
better understanding of external debt data is particularly noteworthy because not all countries 
report to the BIS, so BIS data normally will cover a substantial fraction, but not the totality of 
credit to a given country.
4 Apart from signalling higher debt, BIS data were more timely than 
publicly available external debt data.  
New data collection mechanisms such as the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard 
(SDDS) statistics today provide more comprehensive and more timely data than in the past. 
Partly as a result, the coverage of GDF statistics has improved, providing a more complete 
picture of overall debt burdens (Figure 1, right-hand panel). But BIS statistics still offer an 









                                                  
3   The Bank of Thailand suggested a number of explanations for the substantial upward revision of external debt 
data based on a comprehensive survey. See Bank of Thailand Press Release no 78, 30 June 2000, 
http://www.bot.or.th/BOThomepage/General/PressReleasesAndSpeeches/PressReleases/News%202543/Eng
/n7843e.htm. 
4   Comparisons between BIS creditor data and national external debt data are discussed in von Kleist (2002). 
The BIS statistics do not cover the following: (i) trade credit not extended by banks; (ii) loans from banks not 
included in the reporting for BIS statistics; (iii) any other non-bank private sector loans; (iv) some private 
placement bonds. 
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 Figure 1 
 
 
2.1.2   Lending to banks and non-banks 
BIS statistics break down cross-border bank credit according to whether the recipient is a 
bank or non-bank. This can be of use for a number of reasons. First, the data on external 
borrowing of non-banks are sometimes of poor quality; BIS data offer an independent 
perspective on this. A case in point is credit extended to the Indonesian corporate sector 
prior to the Asian crisis. Because a lot of these transactions occurred offshore, the data 
available from debtor sources were incomplete; indeed market commentary well before the 
Asian crisis of 1997 expressed concerns about the quality of this kind of data (see Union 
Bank of Switzerland (1995)). BIS information from creditors shows the importance of cross-
border lending to non-banks in Indonesia (Figure 2, left-hand panel). The implications can 
also be seen by noting that according to BIS data, total cross-border bank lending to 
Indonesia totalled around $66 billion at its peak in Q3 1997. This was about $28 billion (74%) 
higher than the nearly $38 billion Indonesian publicly-guaranteed and non-guaranteed 
commercial bank debt outstanding estimated from debtor-reported data (see World Bank 
(1999)). Second, cross-border interbank lending can be associated with risks to financial 
stability as it is short term and directly affects liquidity in the financial system (for example, a 
sudden interruption could affect the ability of market participants to settle payments). An 
example is the experience of Thailand on the eve of the Asian crisis (Figure 2, right-hand 
panel). As can be seen, the rapid growth in total cross-border bank credit in BIS statistics 
was driven by interbank lending; cross-border loans to the corporate sector were relatively 
stable. Furthermore, the crisis was associated with a sharp reduction in cross-border 
interbank lending.  
2.1.3  Cross-border to local shift 
BIS consolidated statistics give information on cross-border bank lending and on local claims 
of BIS reporting banks, reflecting activity through branches and subsidiaries. The breakdown 
is useful in assessing overall exposure of BIS reporting banks and its characteristics. To 
illustrate, after the Asian crisis, the amount of cross border bank lending (as proxied for by 
BIS reporting banks’ international claims) to emerging market economies fell sharply in 
Asia.
5 Such lending fell from $740 billion in 1995 to $488 billion in 2000, but has since 
                                                  
5    The proxy is an approximation to pure cross-border lending in part because the BIS international claims 
include onshore claims in foreign currency by foreign bank branches or subsidiaries. These onshore claims 
would be small in countries that are not dollarised. While pure cross-border data are available from the 
locational statistics, the latter do not provide information on local claims. 
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 exceeded its previous peak, to total $774 billion in 2006 (Table 1). Taken together with BIS 
statistics on local claims the data reveal two things. First, during the period when cross-
border bank lending declined, there was a significant increase in local claims, that is, the 
reduction in reporting bank activity was not as severe as suggested by cross-border data 
alone, which are the focus of balance of payments statistics. Second, in spite of the recent 
rebound in cross-border lending, there has been a shift in favour of local claims since 1995. 
In 2006, in the Asia Pacific region the ratio of local claims to foreign claims was about 80%, 
down from a peak of 85% in 2003 but well above 24% in 1995. On balance, experience and 
some research suggest that foreign bank activity can be beneficial (CGFS (2005) and 
Moreno and Villar (2005)), so the increase in onshore foreign bank activity indicates that 
conditions under which emerging markets receive financing from BIS reporting banks may 
have improved since 1995. Financial stability is enhanced further to the extent that onshore 
banking involves credit in local rather than foreign currency, which could reduce currency 




2.2  Maturity structure of external debts and financing requirements 
Apart from having good estimates of total external debt for crisis prevention, it is important to 
have estimates of its maturity structure. BIS statistics allow us to do this, and have the 
desirable characteristic of defining debt structure by remaining maturity.  
These statistics have at least two applications. First, they can tell us what the proportion of 
short-term and long-term debt is as an indicator of possible vulnerability. As can be seen in 
Figure 3, prior to the Asian crisis of 1997, the share of short-term bank debt had become 
quite large in Thailand. It subsequently declined but has since risen again. There was also an 
increase in the share of short-term debt in Turkey prior to its November 2000–February 2001 
crises. 
Second, the statistics can allow us to estimate financing requirements. These are reported 
for Thailand and Turkey in Figure 4. It is apparent that financing requirements increased in 
the periods before crises. For example, in Thailand, financing requirements up to a one-year 
horizon rose sharply in the 1990s, from $9 billion in December 1990 to $48 billion in 1996, on 
the eve of the Asian crisis. For Turkey, the financing requirement rose from around $20 
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 Table 1 
Claims of BIS reporting banks 
  International claims
1 Local currency local claims  Local/International claims %
  1995 2000 2006 1995 2000 2006 1995 2000 2006 
China  48  58  127 0 3  21 1 6  16 
India  16 22 66  8 17 42 54 76 64 
Indonesia  45 40 38  4  5 14  8 11 37 
South  Korea  78  59 124  8  18 144  11  31 116 
Malaysia  17 21 39  4 29 49 25  139  126 
Philippines  8 17 22  1  5  5 17 32 25 
Taiwan,  China  23 18 39 10 16 41 44 90  105 
Thailand  63 27 23  5 17 26  9 62  115 
Asia  740 488 774 174 315 618  24  64  80 
           
Argentina  38 69 17  4 23 14 10 34 81 
Brazil  57 68 69 21 72  112 36  107  163 
Chile  14 22 26  8 28 37 58  124  142 
Colombia  11  12 8 1 5 9 8  46  112 
Mexico  57  64  71  4  80 202  8 126 286 
Peru  6 13 10  1  3  3 10 24 31 
Venezuela  12 13 12  0 10 13  3 76  112 
Latin America 
& Caribbean  212 285 249  44 231 397  21  81 160 
1 Cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currency.  
Source: BIS Consolidated banking statistics.  
 
2.3  Quantifying risk exposures 
2.3.1  Refinancing (ie liquidity) risk and reserves to short-term external debt 
One reason a high share of short-term debt is a concern is because it poses “refinancing” 
risk; during periods of uncertainty creditors may be unwilling to provide additional financing 
because they do not know if there will be enough hard currency resources to service the debt 
(this was the problem faced by Korea in late 1997-early 1998). This can be addressed if 
enough foreign reserves are available to cover short-term debt obligations. A by now 
conventional rule of thumb, known as the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, is that foreign reserves 
should cover at least 100% of short-term external debt; about a year of external debt 
obligations. The Guidotti-Greenspan ratio was found to be a key vulnerability indicator in a 
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The BIS statistics provide the only source of standard data on the remaining maturity of bank 
loans and international bond issues. In combination with IMF statistics on foreign reserves, 
they allow us to see how well countries or regions satisfy the Guidotti-Greenspan criterion. 
As can be seen in Figure 5, four countries hit by the Asian crisis failed to satisfy this criterion 
between 1994 and 1997. Latin America also fell below this benchmark around 2000, while 
Russia was below it until that year.  The situation has changed considerably, foreign reserves 
now substantially exceed external debt in most emerging market economies. Turkey’s 
foreign reserve cover has recently hovered near 100%. 
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 Figure 5 
 
 
2.3.2  CGFS vulnerability indicators 
The CGFS has selected a series of indicators to track potential vulnerabilities in emerging 
market economies, focusing on exchange market pressure, external sector vulnerability and 
banking sector vulnerability (see Hawkins and Klau (2000)). The external vulnerability index 
includes 3 indicators pertaining to external debt (international bond and bank debt as a 
percentage of GDP, level and percentage change over 2 years) and short-term debt as a 
percentage of foreign reserves, the ratio discussed under Section 2.3.1 above.
6 BIS data on 
liabilities to international banks and on international bonds outstanding are available more 
frequently, are more timely, and are more internationally comparable than data on other 
forms of external debt, at least for many countries which do not report SDDS data.  
Moreover, changes in such positions can be important in year-to-year movements in the 
financial account of the balance of payments, and especially during episodes of financial 
stress (eg the Asian crisis). Figure 6 reveals recent trends in indices of external vulnerability, 




                                                  
6   The other indicators are the real effective exchange rate, the current account balance and export growth. 
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 Figure 6 
 
 
2.3.3 Currency  mismatch 
An important source of vulnerability in emerging markets is that some borrowers whose 
earnings are in local currency engage in unhedged foreign currency borrowing. The resulting 
currency mismatch implies that a sharp depreciation of the currency can raise the debt 
burden considerably. For example, around the time of the Asian crisis, the Indonesian 
corporate sector had borrowed heavily in foreign currency. When the rupiah crawling peg 
collapsed, many of these firms went bankrupt, weakening their creditors (domestic banks). 
Goldstein and Turner (2004) use BIS statistics to construct a measure for currency 
mismatches and to quantify a country’s exposure to an exchange rate shock. One potential 
limitation is that a mismatch on the balance sheet can be identified but not the extent to 
which the position has been hedged. In spite of this, the information can be useful. The 
presence of large mismatches would highlight the need to see the extent to which hedging 
does in fact take place. In a number of cases (eg Indonesia in 1997), it was apparent that 
hedging was too costly and did not occur; many Indonesian firms that borrowed from abroad 
could not service their debts. Also, when a systemic crisis occurs, the financial position of the 
providers of hedges may also be impaired.
7 Large mismatches would point to the need to 
examine these issues with some care. 
A key ratio is the ratio between the currency denomination of debt and the share of tradables 
in GDP. More precisely, the currency mismatch (CURMISM) equals the ratio of the foreign 
currency share of total debt (FC%TD) to the ratio of exports to GDP (X/Y).





CURMISM = . 
                                                  
7    In line with this, Allayanis, Brown and Klapper (2000) find that firms in East Asia tended to use foreign 
earnings as a substitute for hedging with derivatives and that during the Asian crisis firms that hedged with 
derivatives did no better than firms that did not hedge. For further discussion see Moreno (2007). 
8   The formula is 
DB IB DCP BKL NBKL
DB IB DCP BKL NBKL
TD FC
+ + + +
+ + + +
=
$ $ $ $ $
%  where $ refers to debt denominated in foreign 
currency and NBKL is liabilities of non-banks (cross-border) to BIS reporting banks, in all currencies, BKL is 
liabilities of banks (cross-border) to BIS reporting banks in all currencies; DCP is domestic credit to the private 
sector (line 32 of monetary survey of IMF IFS); IB is international debt securities (bonds) outstanding in all 
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 Figure 7 
 
 
If this ratio is large – that is, there is relatively more foreign currency debt than foreign 
currency earnings to finance it – then a country could have a problem. In Figure 7, a 
threshold of unity (the 45º line) is used to separate the more vulnerable countries. As can be 
seen, there has been a broad improvement in currency mismatch positions as countries have 
generally moved to the right of the 45º line between 1997-98 and 2005.
9
2.3.4   Credit linkages 
Many emerging market financial crises in the 1990s quickly spread to other countries. By 
contrast, spillovers from the Argentina crisis in 2001-02 appear to have been much more 
limited. Trade and financial linkages are often found to be important determinants of 
spillovers.
10 The BIS consolidated banking statistics, which contain information of bilateral 
flows between the reporting countries and the rest of the world, are naturally an important 
data source for gauging financial linkages. One interesting issue is the impact of countries 
sharing a “common bank lender” on the spread of a financial crisis. Assessment of emerging 
market economies’ financial obligations has often been based on the consolidated cross-
border bank lending data compiled by the BIS. A simple measure is to compare the shares of 
total claims to emerging market economies by major creditors. Table 2 shows that, for 
example, Spanish banks are important lenders to most Latin American countries, while UK 
banks have significant claims on a number of Asian economies. In the event of a crisis in one 
emerging market economy, the spillover depends on how major creditors respond. It may be 
that losses in emerging markets lead to withdrawals of lending predominantly to their large 
debtors; to all debtors proportionately; to those who appear similar in risk characteristics; or 
                                                                                                                                                       
currencies; and DB is domestic debt securities (bonds) outstanding in all currencies.  In all baseline 
calculations, all domestic bonds and domestic bank loans (domestic credit) are assumed to be denominated in 
domestic currency (DB$/DB = DCP$/DCP = 0). 
9   The preceding measure can be multiplied by a measure of the net foreign currency asset position for the 
economy, to construct a measure of the aggregate effective currency mismatch. This is a different concept 
from the net foreign asset position as it focuses on debt (equities and FDI are excluded) and where data are 
available, would take into account the balance sheet position in foreign currency onshore. 
10   See Forbes and Rigobon (1999) for a review of the literature. 
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 to none at all. Those most vulnerable to changes are likely to be the economies with high 
financial dependence on the same developed economy creditor. 
 
Table 2 
Developed countries’ claims on selected EMEs
1
   Sweden  UK 
Euro 
area
2 Austria France Germany Spain  Japan  US 
Asia             
China  0.6 18.2 21.9  0.6 6.4  8.2 0.2 15.8 13.4 
Hong Kong SAR  0.1  47.4 15.9  0.1 6.8  3.3 0.2 8.6 8.2 
India  0.4 20.6 28.6  0.7 4.7  9.3 0.1 6.6  20.7 
Indonesia  0.4 12.1 29.5  1.4 3.4 16.4 0.1 13.7  9.3 
Korea  0.1 30.4 17.4  0.5 6.7  4.7 0.1 6.7  25.2 
Malaysia  0.1 27.4 12.8  0.5 3.2  5.7 0.0 7.1  14.3 
Philippines  1.1 13.9 28.8  1.1 11.2  9.1  0.2 9.0  17.2 
Singapore  1.4 24.4 26.8  0.8 6.1 11.2 0.4 12.0 14.1 
Taiwan, China  0.1 17.9 23.9  0.0 6.7  4.0 0.1 7.6  21.6 
Thailand  0.1 15.8 14.6  0.4 4.4  6.6 0.0 27.2 16.7 
Latin America            
Argentina  0.0 6.8  57.5  0.1  8.5  10.9 31.5  1.6 22.0 
Brazil  0.2 12.6 56.0  0.2  4.0  4.2 23.0  2.7 16.0 
Chile  0.6 3.3  66.9  0.1 3.3  4.8  53.1 1.8  19.2 
Colombia  0.3 2.6  57.3  0.0 2.7  5.2  44.2 1.9  22.3 
Mexico  0.2 10.0 49.3  0.2 1.4  2.2  42.0 1.2  29.8 
Peru  0.2 2.6  63.0  0.0 1.9  5.9  52.0 2.3  17.0 
Uruguay  0.6 6.7  49.6  0.7  2.2  6.2 17.1  1.7 22.7 
Venezuela  0.3 4.4  78.1  0.1 7.6 11.6  53.2 2.1 7.9 
1 Percentage of total foreign claims of each EME in 2006 Q1.  
2 Includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: BIS. 
Key:    0 – 40%     40 – 50%     50 – 60%     > 60% 
 
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) estimate the similarity in the dependence of emerging 
market economies on common creditors for financing (see Chui, Hall and Taylor (2004)).
11 
One such measure is an index of relative fund competition (B) in third markets (subscript K) 
by two emerging market economies (subscripts i and j). This index has two terms. The first 
term captures the overall importance of the common lender (say UK banks) for the two 
emerging market economies, while the second term measures the extent to which the two 
emerging markets compete for bank loans from the common creditor. The index is designed 
to lie between 0 and 1 with a maximum value of 1 indicating countries that share the same 
set of common creditors. Table 3 shows index values for a number of emerging market 
                                                  
11   They do this by extending the approach used by Glick and Rose (1999) to measure trade linkages. 
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 economies which share common creditors in 2006 Q1 in the form of a heat map. It is 




Index of international bank credit linkage (2006 Q1) 
   Asia  Latin  America  Other 


































































































Asia  C h i n a                          
   Korea  0.78                  
   Thailand  0.82  0.73                 
Latin  Argentina  0.59  0.62  0.54                          
America  Brazil  0.54  0.56 0.48 0.67               
   Chile 0.41  0.47  0.39  0.75  0.61              
   Mexico 0.37  0.50  0.40  0.80  0.66  0.79             
   Uruguay  0.53  0.62  0.51  0.75  0.81  0.62  0.71            
   Venezuela 0.49  0.43  0.38  0.76  0.55  0.84  0.68  0.55           
Other  Russia  0.55 0.50 0.45 0.54 0.46 0.34 0.28 0.49 0.52        
   South Africa  0.53  0.59  0.51 0.35 0.38 0.27 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.36      
   Turkey   0.69  0.63  0.58  0.60  0.55 0.37 0.36 0.51  0.50  0.67 0.45    
K: Creditor countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States. i and j: Emerging market economies. 
Source: BIS consolidated banking statistics. 
 
While the heat map creates a snapshot of potential vulnerability at a point in time, the 
development of the index for a given country pair over time provides information on the ebb 
and flow of credit concentrations. This has been plotted for Argentina and Uruguay in 
Figure 8.
13
Following very high creditor linkage during the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s, 
when both countries depended on US banks for almost all their credit, there is clear 
diversification of creditor origin during the early 1990s, followed by a return of US banks. 
                                                  
12   The index formula is: 
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13   The index formula for the left-hand panel of Figure 8 is calculated taking i for Argentina and j for Uruguay, the 
K countries are in the note of Table 1. In the right-hand panel of Figure 8, the four lines are the 4 largest of the 
K components which sum to the index. For example, K is fixed at, say, country 5 and then the index is 
calculated through i and j for all periods. 
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 These withdrew during the Asian crisis, resulting in a credit concentration from Spanish 
banks in both countries. Spanish banks retreated partially during the Argentine crisis, when 
the crisis spillover hit Uruguay, causing a temporary concentration of credit on German 
banks. In the most recent past, the index indicates that both countries have stabilised their 





BIS statistics have a wide range of applications. They made up for gaps in other data or 
indicators at the time that they were introduced. This has resulted in cooperative efforts to 
improve national debt reporting systems (eg non-bank BoP flows) that now systematically 
rely on or are cross-checked with BIS statistics. We have provided examples of certain types 
of analysis that can only be done systematically and in a timely fashion using BIS statistics. 
Looking ahead two issues arise. First, whether some of the BIS data will be superseded by 
data compilations elsewhere. Second, the possibilities for enhancing BIS data. For example, 
before the introduction of the Euro, the CGFS examined whether the currency breakdown in 
the banking statistics could be streamlined. The resulting distortions in the data were, 
however, regarded as unacceptable. Instead, today one might consider expanding the 
currency breakdown with currencies used in important emerging economies, in cases where 
these data are available without additional reporting burden. Apart from this, policy makers 
may identify new information needs (eg on hedge funds) that warrant the compilation of new 
types of BIS statistics to address new types of risks. 
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